In the following posts I would try to describe some practices that aiming to hide debt, known as off-balance sheet debts. These days the Examiners of the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy has came to light a practice named 'Repo 105' used in the previous days to quarterly ends and fiscal year ends. Repo 105 is a short-term financing method which guaranteed the creditor with a repurchase commitment from the vendor in addition to a 105% of asset-backed financing. These transactions are cancelled in the following 7 to 10 days. Under US GAAP, this practice could be understand as a sale of assets and thus, could be booked a sale and the cash receipt. But this literally interpretation could allow accounting fraud to the extent not to show a true and fair view of the financial statement even more if these transactions are not properly disclosed in the notes to financials. Under IFRS, this transaction is required to be booked as a short-term financing against the cash received and financial costs in addition to further disclosure requirements.
Investment banks used to, amongst other, finance its short-term funding requirements with it. The fraud started since the company aiming to reduce its leverage ratio at quarterly ends hide the real situation by means of repo transactions and not disclosing it in the quarterly reports sent to the SEC. This financing achieved roughly $60 billion in the quarterly ended 28 February 2008. Lehman achieved its purpose by reducing its leverage ratio from 13.9 to 12.1 by means of the Repo 105. Credit rating agencies held the scoring and markets received Lehman's shares increasing. When repo's counterparts ceased to finance Lehman it went bankrupt. Currently, watchdogs, SEC officials and the press are looking for whipping boys and auditors (Ernst & Young) are in the spotlight.



